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Problem: What are the requirements for a group to be considered a civilian population 
(sivilbefolkning) according to the Norwegian Criminal Statute (Straffeloven) 2005, 
§102? 
(Hva skal til for at en gruppe blir regnet som en sivilbefolkning etter Straffeloven 2005 
§102?) 
 
     1. Introduction 
 
     The Norwegian Criminal Statute (Straffeloven) 20th May 2005, no. 28 §102 is about 
crime against humanity (forbrytelse mot menneskeheten). Because it is such a recent 
statute (it was made into law 20th May 2005 and it came into force from 7th March 
2008), not a lot of Norwegian legal literature or court cases have been written about it 
or taken place, this also because it refers to acts that are uncommon in a peaceful 
democracy like Norway. (This has somewhat been altered through the attack on Utøya 
in Norway on 22nd July 2011.) NOU-2002-04, which arguably is the most important of 
the preparatory works (forarbeidene) of the section, refers to article 7 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Thus it is important to take into account the 
Rome Statue, as well as the court cases before International Criminal Court (ICC). (The 
Rome Statute is the treaty that established the ICC.) Court cases from ICC that are 
relevant for crimes against humanity are the cases concerning Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Darfur in Sudan, the Republic of Kenya, the Central African Republic, 
Libya and the Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire). Other cases from other international courts 
that are of interest are the Nuremberg trials, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in South Africa, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It is worth looking into 
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these cases also because the ICC is a relatively new institution (it came into being on 1st 
July 2002, at the same time as the Rome Statute entered into force, while the Rome 
Statute was adopted on 17th July 1998), and therefore does not have a long history of 
court cases. Another reason it is necessary to look into international court cases, is that 
the issue is, primarily, of international character.  
 
     When examining the term ‘civilian population’ in Strl. §102 it is important to follow 
and use the sources of law (rettskildefaktorer fra (rettskildelæren)). First the Strl. §102 
must be examined, looking first at the linguistic meaning of the words that constitute the 
term, to better understanding the legal meaning. Then the preparatory works must be 
examined, and the one of importance here is NOU-2002-04, and it points to the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. Because this preparatory work refers to the Rome Statute, i.e. the 
treaty of an international tribunal, it is also natural to examine cases from other 
international tribunals that also deal with crimes against humanity. Thus the cases 
(rettspraksis) from international tribunals that are based on treaties or statutes that 
contains sections about crimes of humanity, including the ICC, must be examined. It is 
also worthwhile to look into opinions (rettsoppfatninger) in legal theory, though not 
legal theory has been written exactly about the term ‘civilian population’. Assessment of 
the term (reelle hensyn) can also play a part in the understanding of the term. Through 
this process a more thorough interpretation and understanding of the term ‘civilian 
population’ may be achieved.  
 
     The attack on AUF (Arbeiderpartiets Ungdomsfylking – the Norwegian Labor Party’s 
youth organization) on Utøya in Norway on 22nd July 2011, is also worth looking into, 
and the attack has made the issue of crime against humanity and what a civil population 
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is, topical. Straffeloven (Strl.) §102 could arguably be applied in that case. However it is 
worth noticing that it is still undecided by the court whether the perpetrator, Anders 
Bering Breivik, should be considered criminally insane (strafferettslig utilregnelig) or 
not. If he is, he cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, but the section could still have 
been relevant, because it would still be necessary to prove that he transgressed against 
all of the components of Strl. §102, and he could be sentenced to compulsory mental 
health care (tvungent psykisk helsevern) (Str. 1902 §39, first paragraph), as long as he 
would be considered psychotic (psykotisk) when the offence took place (Strl. 1902 §44, 
first paragraph). The question would be, among the other conditions, whether the AUF-
camp could be seen as a civilian population. But even if Strl. §102 could have been used, 
the prosecution’s indictment in fact uses other sections that have been considered to be 
closer to the acts committed by the offender.  
 
The issue being discussed in this thesis is what constitutes a “sivilbefolkning” (civilian 
population) in Strl. §102 – it will be debated what falls into this category so that the 
perpetrator can be tried for crimes against humanity, and what falls outside. This raises 
the question of what characteristics a civilian population has. The first part of the term is 
“civilian”. What is considered civilian? Could for example a military population also be 
seen as a civilian population when under attack, if the attacked population was not 
acting in a military capacity, but a civilian? It is also worth noting who can be considered 
civilian and who, for example, military – the prime minister of Norway might be seen as 
a civilian, but the king of Norway as military. The second part of the term civilian 
population, is “population”. The question is whether the population needs to be of a 
certain size, and where the line should be drawn between a larger population and a 
population so small that what was committed against that population cannot be 
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considered a crime against humanity. The characteristic of “civilian” also plays in when 
considering the word “population”. The term “civilian population” must anyway be 
considered as separate words, but also together as a complete term, carrying (a) specific 
meaning(s), i.e. the words must be interpreted in their context. 
 
     For someone to be sentenced for a crime against humanity, the action, according to 
Strl. §102, has to be “ledd i et utbredt eller systematisk angrep” – part of a widespread 
and systematic attack. This means that the actions mentioned in letter a to k in the 
section, and which may be seen as equally grave, are not considered crimes against 
humanity as long as they are not part of a widespread and systematic attack. This even if 
they might be considered war crimes (if they were committed during armed conflict). 
The discussion in this thesis will be limited against a wider discussion of the other 
conditions in the Strl. §102, as well as against a thorough discussion of the section’s 
letters a to k.   
 
     In the field of criminal law, the principle of legality (legalitetsprinsippet) is of great 
importance, because in this field decisions and sentences often have wide-ranging 
impact. It is a constitutional principle, and it is important for a state under the rule of 
law (rettsstat). Through the principle of legality no one can be sentenced without the 
legal authority (hjemmel) of a statute (lov), this according to Norwegian Constitution 
(Grunnloven) §98. It can also be said in the way that the state cannot intervene in the 
citizens’ legal spheres (borgernes rettssfære) without the legal authority of a statute. It 
must be kept in mind when dealing with Str. §102, because the interpretation of term 
‘civilian population’ in the section cannot be too wide or liberal (utvidende tolkning), so 
as not to have basis in the wording of the text. However, the understanding of the term 
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can be stricter (innskrenkende tolkning). Because of this, the problem under debate – 
what constitutes a civilian population according to the Strl. 2005 §102 – must take as its 
starting point and be faithful to the wording of this section in the Norwegian Criminal 
Statute (Strl). The Rome Statute and legal texts can only be an aid, while the emphasis 
has always to be on the wording in Strl. §102.  
 
     One important difference between war crimes and crimes against humanity is that 
crimes against humanity can only be committed towards a population who can in some 
way be considered civil, while war crimes can be committed also against non-civil 
populations, for example prisoners of war (POW). Because of this, the word “sivil” 
(civilian) in “civilian population” is of vital importance to distinguish between war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, and this is useful because the two crimes are often 
committed during armed conflict in concert, but crimes against humanity can also be 
committed outside of armed conflict.  
 
     There is a difference between Strl. §102 and article 7 in the Rome Statute. (Article 7 is 
referred to in NOU-2002-04. Ny Straffelov §16-3.) While Strl. §102 talks about the crime 
has to be “part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a population” 
(“…ledd i et utbredt eller systematisk angrep rettet mot en sivilbefolkning…”) as such, 
while the Rome Statute article 7 also demands that the perpetrator did so “with 
knowledge of the attack”. This is an added condition that has no equivalent in Strl. §102, 
and making the application of the article 7 more difficult, because it also demands 
knowledge of this widespread and systematic attack against a population. NOU-2002-04 
§16-3 (and §7-5) demands instead a normal condition of intent (alminnelig 
forsettskrav). This is a difference worth noting. Even though it is important to look at the 
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Rome Statute (as NOU-2002-04 does), it is important to remember this difference, 
because whether crime against humanity is applicable to the same event according to 
the laws of the ICC and Norwegian law, can vary. It is more likely that under Norwegian 
law an attack would be considered a crime against humanity than under ICC. The Rome 
Statute helps to guide the interpretation of Str. §102, and under Norwegian law as here 
discussed it is the Norwegian section that is decisive.  
 
     2. About the interpretation of the word ‘population’ in the term ‘civilian 
population’ 
 
     On a general note, within international law, it can be stated that the population has to 
be of a certain size, but that it does not need to be the entire population of a state or a 
territory. The international law is of importance when interpreting the term ‘civilian 
population’ in Strl. §102 because of the preparatory work NOU-2002-04, and the 
principle of presumption (it will be discussed later). Kriangsak Kittichaisaree writes that 
“‘(t)he ‘population’ element does not mean that the entire population of a given State or 
territory must be targeted; it is intended to indicate the collective nature of crimes 
against humanity that excludes single or isolated acts punishable as war crimes or 
crimes against municipal law not rising to the level of crimes against humanity.” 1 The 
word ‘population’ in ‘civilian population’ has, in other words, to be understood as that 
the member or members targeted belong to a specific group, for it to be a crime against 
humanity. Kittichaisaree continues: “The targeted population must be predominantly 
civilian in nature although the presence of certain non-civilians in their midst does not 
change the character of that population. In other words, the individual victim is 
                                                        
1 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001, p. 95.  
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victimized because of his membership of a civilian population targeted by the accused.”2 
For the ‘civilian population’ term to be fulfilled this (civilian) group has to exist within 
and among the group that is targeted, but this group could also contain individuals that 
do not belong to this population, or also contain other populations.  
 
     3. The hypothetical situation with the bombing of a city containing civilians 
 
     An interesting hypothetical situation is when for example a city is bombed. To look 
into this type of situation can help to highlight when Str. §102 and its condition ‘civilian 
population’ can be used. Will Strl. §102 be applicable in that the civilians that inhabited 
the city can be seen as a “civilian population” (“sivilbefolkning”)? And what if there in 
this city has no or little military forces? Instances in history from the 20th century when 
similar events took place include the bombing of Dresden in Nazi-Germany by the allies 
(the British Royal British Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Force 
(USAAF)) from 13 to 15 February 1945 (towards the end of the Second World War), 
with 3,900 tons of incendiary devices and high-explosive bombs. Also, the allies dropped 
atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (on 6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (on 
9 August 1945), during the latter stage of the Second World War.  
 
     Depending on the size of the city, it will most likely be inhabited by different groups of 
people with different affiliations and identities, i.e. defining characteristics. The larger 
the city and the more inhabitants, the more likely is it that it will have more and bigger 
groups, all with different defining characteristics. This could mean that some civilian 
groups could fulfill the condition of (“civilian) population”, but others possibly not, so 
                                                        
2 Ibid., p. 95.  
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that “crimes against humanity” in Strl. §102 could be seen to have been committed 
against some groups/populations but not against others. This could also lead to the 
hypothetical situation where a city containing civilians were bombed, but there was 
committed no crimes against humanity, because there existed no sufficiently strong 
distinguishing characteristic(s) within and/or between the groups for any to be 
considered civilian populations. But it is highly unlikely that something like that would 
occur, and it therefore remains a faint hypothetical situation, because one, and probably 
several, distinguishing characteristic would exist within or between different groups. 
And war crimes could possibly be applicable anyway.  
 
     4. The Norwegian Criminal Statute (Straffeloven) §102, dualism and possible 
sector-monism 
  
     Norwegian law primarily adheres to the principle of dualism in relation to 
international law. This is of relevance in relation to Strl. §102, because of the section’s 
connection with international law. According to this principle of dualism, national and 
international law are seen as two separate systems. If one, according to this principle, is 
to apply the international law within national law, it has to have been made part of the 
national law (unless it is not in conflict with national law). If it is in conflict with national 
law, it is the national law, and not the international law, that is applicable. It is not 
enough that the state has become a party to for example an international treaty, for the 
international treaty or law to be directly applicable within national law; it has to have 
been directly been made a part of it. This can be achieved either through incorporation 
or transformation. Incorporation refers primarily to when national law makes a 
reference to the international law, stating that the international law is applicable. 
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Transformation refers primarily to when international law is made into national law 
through written reproduction of sections of the treaty in sections of Norwegian law.  
 
     Because dualism is the main principle in Norwegian Law, Strl. §102 follows this 
principle as well. Still, regarding its interpretation the preparatory work NOU-2002-04 
refers to article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Does this then mean that this section 
does not adheres completely to the principle of dualism, and is it in fact an example of 
sector-monism? 
 
    Monism is another principle of international law, where the principle is that 
international and national law are part of the same system of law. If, for the 
interpretation, of Str. §102, it is necessary to look to international law according to the 
preparatory works, it would seem that it is an application of monism within the larger 
dualistic Norwegian law system. This is often called sector-monism. But it is worth 
mentioning that dualism is not an absolute principle within Norwegian law. There are 
some modifications, including the fact that Norwegian law should be interpreted with 
the idea that Norwegian law is presumed to be in compliance with international law. 
(But where international law and Norwegian law is in conflict, Norwegian law still has to 
be followed).  
 
     The idea that Norwegian law is presumed to be in compliance with international law 
(presumsjonsprinsippet), is an argument for viewing the use of international law by the 
preparatory works of Strl. §102, as being part of the Norwegian law use/interpretation 
of the concept of dualism. Strl. §102 (from the new Criminal Statute/Strl. that was 
adopted 20th May 2005) only recently came into force (7th March 2008). Because it is so 
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recent, it is also more natural to use the international law of the ICC as well as court 
cases of the ICC, because there has been little time for this type of court cases to appear 
before Norwegian courts where this section is applied, and since the preparatory work 
NOU-2002-04 specifically refers to the Rome treaty of the ICC, it is natural to look into 
its court cases to interpret the section in accordance with the ICC and the principle of 
presumption (presumsjonsprinsippet). It must also be taken into account that Norway is 
a much smaller and more organized society than some other parts of the world, so it is 
rare that these types of cases occur in Norway, and when they do, it is natural to look to 
cases from international tribunals. That the preparatory work of NOU-2002-04 
specifically refers to article 7 of the ICC makes it and the court cases from the ICC 
regarding that section directly applicable. But it is also necessary to look into cases from 
other international tribunals because they refer to similar cases, and will help to 
enlighten the application of the Norwegian section. It is also underlined through the use 
of the dualistic principle in Norwegian law, that Norwegian law is presumed to be in 
compliance with international law, as long as it is not in direct conflict with it, making 
court cases from international tribunals relevant in the interpretation of the section, 
exactly because of this presumption. This means that even if the preparatory works did 
not directly refer to the Rome Statute of the ICC, international law/court cases from 
international tribunals would still be applicable exactly because of this presumption of 
Norwegian law being in compliance with international law. But the fact that NOU-2002-
04 specifically refers to the ICC, gives of course added value to the Rome Statute and its 
relevant court cases, but also indirectly court cases from other international tribunals.  
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      5. Comparison between crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide 
     In the Norwegian Criminal Statute (Straffeloven 2005, 20. mai, Nr. 28), §101 refers to 
the crime of genocide (folkemord). It is worthwhile to compare this section on genocide 
with the section on crimes against humanity (§102) in the same law, because the two 
sections are similar and cover closely linked crimes. Comparing the two can help to 
make it clearer where one or the other (here in particular §102) is applicable. By doing 
this one can highlight what links the two, as well as what separates them, thus informing 
and making more thorough the interpretation of these sections.  
     Strl. §102 concerns crimes against humanity that is part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population (“forbrytelse mot 
menneskeheten… som ledd i et utbredt eller systematisk angrep rettet mot en 
sivilbefolkning”), with different alternatives of the acts committed following these 
conditions. Strl. §101, on the other hand, concerns the crime of genocide, and it must be 
committed with the purpose to wholly or partly to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group (“i hensikt helt eller delvis å ødelegge en nasjonal, etnisk, rasemessig 
eller religiøs gruppe”), also this section with different alternatives of the acts committed 
following these conditions. The word genocide was coined by the Polish legal scholar 
Raphael Lemkin, and the term genocide is often considered to be a specific form of 
crimes against humanity. An important difference between the two sections is that Strl. 
§102 concerns “civilian population”, while Strl. §101 concerns a “national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group”. Still, civilian population in §102 can encompass national, ethnic, 
racial or religious groups, so here there is arguably no real difference. One element that 
separates the two sections is that for Strl. §101 to be applicable it is necessary that the 
offender has acted with the intent of wholly or partly destroying such a group (“i hensikt 
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helt eller delvis å ødelegge en… gruppe”). Strl. §102 on the other hand, demands that the 
offender has committed an act that is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population (“…som ledd i et utbredt eller systematisk angrep rettet 
mot en sivilbefolkning…”). In Strl. §102 there is no equal intent on destroying the whole 
or part of the group/population, but there is arguably, though this is a much debated 
issue, an intent to direct the attack against the group/population precisely because of 
what type of (civilian) population, meaning that this group has a defining characteristic 
in that it is for example national, ethnic, racial or religious group (as §101 states). In 
other words, the intent in §102 (about crimes against humanity), is to direct the attack 
against the population exactly because of its status as a particular social population. In 
§101 about genocide the intent must include this element  (the intent to direct (an 
attack) against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group), but it must also include the 
intent to wholly or partly destroy the group. Therefore §101 about genocide has one 
more element of intent than §102 about crimes against humanity. This difference 
constitutes the clearest difference between the two sections, and when the offender had 
the intent to wholly or partly destroy the group, it is possible and more natural to use 
section §101 (genocide) as opposed to §102 (crime against humanity), but if the 
offender did not have this intent then  §101 cannot be used. Regarding the conditions for 
applying the sections, in the main, initial parts of the §101 about genocide and §102 
about crimes against humanity, §101 contains as one more condition of intent (as 
shown).  
     But there is also the difference between the two sections that §102 about genocide 
contains a much longer list of additional, potential conditions, (§102 contains 11 (a-k), 
while §101 contains 5 (a-e), so that it is arguably easier to apply §102 about crimes 
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against humanity than §101 about genocide, because there are more situations where 
§102 is applicable, especially when taking into account that the main, initial part of the 
section contains one less condition (about intent) than §101 about genocide. And the 
prosecution will often choose crimes against humanity instead of genocide. Neither 
section has a condition of only being applicable in armed conflict, so that both can be 
used outside of wartime. The sections of war crimes in the Norwegian Criminal Statute 
(Str. §104 - §107), on the other hand, can just be applied to armed conflicts (for example 
Strl. §104: “i forbindelse med en væpnet konflikt”).   
 
     6. The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg 
     It is useful to look into the Nuremberg trial because before and during these trials the 
modern concept of crimes against humanity continued to form. The presumption 
principle and that the preparatory work of Strl. §102 refers to the statute of an 
international tribunal (the ICC), are other reasons why it is worth studying these cases 
from this international tribunal (the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg). The 
first formulation of the concept came from a declaration jointly issued by the French, 
British and Russian Governments on 28 May 1915, in response to the mass killings of 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire – they phrased it as “crimes… against humanity and 
civilization...”3 Most likely the phrasing was a way of trying to deal with a “short-term 
political problem”4 as Antonio Cassese points out. He underlines that they did not decide 
“whether by ‘humanity’ they meant ‘all human beings’ or rather ‘the feelings of humanity 
                                                        
3 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, Great Britain, 2003, p. 67. 
4 Ibid., pp. 67, 68. 
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shared by men and women of modern nations’ or even ‘the concept of humanity 
propounded by ancient and modern philosophy’”.5  
     The special Commission that was created after the First World War suggested to the 
Versailles Conference that “offences against the laws of humanity” should be included in 
the jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal, but this did not take place partly 
because of the statements of James Brown Scott and Robert Lansing, two 
representatives from the United States, in their ‘Memorandum of Reservations’. It stated 
that “crimes should be punished because ‘the laws and customs of war are a standard 
certain’… the ‘laws and principles of humanity are not certain, varying with time, place 
and circumstance, and according, it may be, to the conscience of the individual judge. 
There is no fixed and universal standard of humanity’…”, this “‘if for no other reason, 
should exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged 
with the administration of criminal law’”.6 This memorandum convinced or hindered the 
Commission from including “offences against the laws of humanity” into report.  
     Before and during the Second World War, there existed warfare laws that had rules 
against transgressions against the enemy or their populations, but no rules specifically 
against inhuman acts performed by a nation taking part in a war, against its own 
citizens.7 The Germans had in fact committed such inhuman acts for racial or political 
reasons against their own population, in that Jews, gypsies, social democrats, 
communists, trade union members, and members of the church were targeted by the 
Nazi regime. At the end of the Second World War acts such as persecution for racial or 
political purposes, even if done against civilians of occupied territories, were not 
                                                        
5 Ibid., p. 67. 
6 Ibid., p. 68. 
7 Ibid., p. 68. 
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actually prohibited, as Antonio Cassese points out.8 There were some among the allies 
that supported the idea in 1945, of just executing the (major) war criminals, but upon 
the initiative of the United States, the Allies instead agreed to try them in front of a 
tribunal. The London Agreement embodied the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, and had a clause were the accused could be tried and possibly punished of 
crimes against “humanity”: “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution or in 
connexion (sic) with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”9    
     Criticism that has been raised against the proviso, by among others the 
aforementioned Cassese, is that for crimes against humanity to become applicable, it had 
to be within the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal. For this to be the 
case, the crimes against humanity had to be committed in connection with crimes 
against peace or war crimes. Cassese writes that this link “was not spelled out, but it was 
clear that it was only within the context of a war or of the unleashing of unlawful 
aggression that these crimes could be prosecuted and punished.”10 This, according to E. 
Schwelb, meant that just certain criminal acts were punished, such as those that 
“directly affected the interests of other States”11 through war and or crimes against 
enemy combatants or enemy civilians. This excluded several potentially criminal acts, 
but lessoned repercussions for third states.12 But nonetheless, the new category of 
                                                        
8 Ibid., pp. 68, 69. 
9 Ibid., p. 69. 
10 Ibid., p. 69. 
11E. Schwelb, “Crimes Against Humanity”, 23 BYIL (1946), p. 207, referred to in referred to in Antonio 
Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, Great Britain, 2003, p. 69. 
12 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, Great Britain, 2003, p. 69. 
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“crimes against humanity” was clearly established, and would evolve further from this 
starting point. Cassese points out that the creation of “crimes against humanity” showed 
that “the international community” broadened the group of acts that could be seen as of 
“’meta-national’ concern”.13 The idea that “crimes against humanity” propagated, was 
that there are essential values that are, or should be, intrinsic to any human being (“in 
the notion, humanity did not mean ‘mankind’ or ‘human race’ but ‘the quality’ or concept 
of human being”, Cassese underlines).14 This new creation also signaled that crimes 
could be punished even if not prohibited by national law, or as the British Chief 
Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross put it, there existed restrictions to the “omnipotence 
of the State”.15  
     The defendants during the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, were 24 of the most important captured leaders of the 
of Germany under the Nazis, so it is natural to look into the contents of this/these 
particular tribunal/cases among the several (parts of) the Nuremberg Trials. The 
tribunal used the Charter of the Nuremberg International Tribunal Article 6 (c), which 
concerned crimes against humanity. All the defendants were members of the Nazi Party, 
and according to the tribunal they “formulated and executed a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity as defined in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. 
This plan involved, among other things, the murder and persecution of all who were 
suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who were suspected of 
being opposed to the common plan alleged in Count One.”16 The common plan alleged in 
Count One refers to “a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the 
                                                        
13 Ibid., p. 70. 
14 Ibid., p. 70. 
15 Ibid., p. 70. 
16 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, 14 November 
1945 to 1 October 1946, Published in Nuremberg, Germany, 1947, Volume 1, Official Documents, p. 65. 
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commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, as 
defined in the Charter of the Tribunal…”17 A social population needs to have a 
distinguishing feature to fit into the definition in Str. § 102. In and of itself, the wording 
of “all who were suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who 
were suspected of being opposed to the common plan…”18 is clearly too wide. More or 
less anyone could fall into such a broadly defined category, as is show by the word usage 
“all who were…” But in the official documents of the trial before the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, it is further stated that the persecutions “were directed 
against Jews.”19 Here the condition of social population in regards to for example Strl. § 
102 is clearly fulfilled, because Jews are a social population that has the distinguishing 
feature of being of a common ethnic and/or religious characteristic. Even though such a 
characteristic could be disputed in everyday parlance, the Jews were at least seen to 
have this/these common characteristics by the Nazi Party and the Nazis, and this is 
enough to fulfill the condition of social population in regards to Strl. § 102. It is primarily 
the ethnic component more than the religious one that is important, because a part of 
the Jews were atheists or agnostics and thus not religious as such.  
      
7. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
 
     It is worthwhile to see how international tribunals such as the ICTY handle cases that 
deal with crimes against humanity, because the presumption principle also makes it 
important to study cases from international tribunals such as the ICTY, because 
                                                        
17 Ibid., p. 29. 
18 Ibid., p. 65. 
19 Ibid., p. 66. 
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Norwegian law is presumed to be in accordance with international law. The preparatory 
work NOU-2002-04 refers to the Rome Statute of the ICC in connection with crimes 
against humanity, so other international tribunals that deal with the same types of 
crimes and cases (such as the ICTY) are useful indicators of how the condition of ‘civilian 
population’ is interpreted, so as to achieve a more thorough and well-reasoned 
interpretation of the same condition in Norwegian law. In the prosecution of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s marked-up indictment of 
Radovan Karadzic it is held that Karadzic and Ratko Mladic took part in joint criminal 
enterprises, and “the pursuit of each of these objectives were related to the objective of 
the overarching joint criminal enterprise to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and 
Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory20” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
objectives of the three joint criminal enterprises they partook in were “(1) to spread 
terror among the civilian population of Sarajevo through a campaign of sniping and 
shelling, (2) to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, (3) to take United Nations 
personnel as hostages.”21  
 
     Point (1) raises the question of whether “the civilian population” of a city is precise 
enough to fall within the term “civilian population” in §102, because of the size of the 
city (Sarajevo) and the different religious/ethnic groups within it. Sarajevo was and is 
the capital of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was before one of the biggest 
cities in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  As of 2012 it has a population of 
                                                        
20 Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor vs Radovan Karadzic, Prosecution’s Marked-Up Indictment, The 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Case No. IT-95-
5-/18-PT, 19 October 2009, p. 4.  
21 Ibid., p. 4. 
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311,161 people22, and when the terror was spread from approximately October 1991 to 
30 November 1995 it was a city with a population of several hundred thousand people, 
as well. This raises the question of whether such a big population can be considered a 
civilian population in the context of Strl. §102. The size in itself cannot be a hindrance 
for viewing it as such, but because this population was the inhabitants of a city, it means 
that it is more probable that it contained varies groups of people with different 
distinguishing features. In fact Sarajevo did and does contain different large religious 
groups such as Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Jews. These groups could 
also be seen partly as ethnic. There could be other distinguishing features that connect 
the groups of the different religions/ethnicities together, but in this instance the most 
natural and strongest distinguishing feature is the ethnicity/religious affiliations. It 
could be argued that the different religious/ethnic groups belonging to the same city 
could be seen as a distinguishing feature, but this must generally be seen as a too weak 
connection, and especially in this instance the connection is too weak because the 
different religious/ethnic groups were at the time in conflict with each other, so that this 
potential connection/distinguishing feature is invalid. Thus, the population of Sarajevo 
cannot be taken as one civilian group whom terror was spread against. Arguably, the 
different groups could on their own be seen as social groups, but this is not the content 
of point (1) in the objectives of the criminal enterprise described in the ICTY indictment. 
Because of this, and in regards to strl. §102, the condition of civilian population is not 
fulfilled.  
 
          The objective of the criminal enterprise in point (2) to eliminate Bosnian Muslims 
in Srebrenica, is an action directly targeting a population because it consists of several 
                                                        
22 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarajevo, 01/03/2012. 
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individuals, and that they are in one defined geographical area could arguably 
strengthen the argument that they are in fact a population. They can also be considered 
a population because they have the distinguishing feature of both a common ethnicity 
(Bosnian) and a common religious identity (Islam). The population of Bosnian Muslims 
in Srebrenica consisted primarily of civilians, and adults and children of both sexes were 
among the victims. Men and boys were killed, and women, children and some elderly 
men were forcibly removed.23 Therefore the part “civilian” of the term civilian 
population is fulfilled, and it was a civilian population that was targeted. 
 
     Point (3), which regards taking United Nations personnel as hostages, raises some 
interesting questions. The United Nations personnel perform duties for an international 
organization, and are from different nations and of different ethnicities and with 
different religious orientations. Therefore the question arises whether the United 
Nations personnel have a defining characteristic so as to be considered a population. 
That they all work for the United Nations could arguably be considered such a defining 
characteristic, but this leads to another question – whether they can be considered 
civilian. They were armed, and this could lead to one taking the stance that they are not 
civilian, but rather military. But, on the other hand, they were not engaging in the war as 
one party fighting against another party, but rather as peacekeepers and in a protection 
capacity. A population can arguably both be considered military in one situation or 
perspective and civilian in another. But in this instance it is more natural to view the 
United Nations personnel more as civilians, exactly because of them partaking in a more 
peacekeeping and protection capacity. They consisted of several individuals, a group, 
                                                        
23 Trial Chamber III, The Prosecutor vs Radovan Karadzic, Prosecution’s Marked-Up Indictment, The 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY),Case No. IT-95-
5-/18-PT, 19 October 2009, p. 10, 11. 
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and they have the defining characteristic of being United Nations personnel, and 
therefore could be seen to be a population. And when also considered civilian, they 
would thus be a civilian population.  
 
     Under the headline “The Charges Count 1 (Persecutions)” in the third indictment 
against Vojislav Seselj, it is stated that from or about 1 August 1991 until at least 
September 1993, Seselj “acted individually or as a participant of a joint criminal 
enterprise, planned, ordered, instigated, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in 
the planning, preparation or execution of, or physically committed, persecutions of 
Croat, Muslim and other non-Serb civilian populations in the territories of the SAO SBWS 
(Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem), and in the municipalities of Zvornik, “Greater 
Sarajevo”, Mostar, and Nevesinje in Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of Vojvodina in 
Serbia” .24 These acts constituted, according to the ICTY, transgression against Article 7-
1 of the Statute of the Tribunal25, and these acts were according to the ICTY 
“persecutions committed on political, racial and religious grounds…”26 
 
     Croat and Muslim populations have (each population on their own) the defining 
characteristics of religion, as well as arguably politics and race. The general term of 
other non-Serbian civilian populations is too undefined to pass as a civilian population, 
because it is simple a negation of a political or ethnic defining characteristic (Serbian). 
The Croat and Muslim populations can, when considered on their own, be seen as 
civilian populations because they have these (positive) defining characteristics in 
                                                        
24 The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Vojislav Seselj, The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Case No. IT-03-67, 7 December 2007, p. 5. 
25 Ibid., p. 2. 
26 Ibid., p. 5. 
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common within their populations, and as long as they are civilian, they can therefore be 
taken to be civilian populations as such. 
 
     Milan Babic is, according to his indictment from the ICTY, “individually criminally 
responsible for the crimes referred to in Article 3 and 5 of the Statute of the 
Tribunal…”27 Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal (ICTY) concerns crimes against 
humanity, and is very similar in form to Strl. §102 and Article 7 of the Rome Statute (the 
ICC). It states that the “International Tribunal shall have power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether 
international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: a) 
murder; b) extermination; c) enslavement; d) deportation; e) imprisonment; f) torture; 
g) rape; h) persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds; i) other inhumane 
acts.”28 All three rules concern crimes against humanity, but the greatest difference 
between Strl §102 and Article 7 of the Rome statute on the one hand, and Article 5 of the 
Statute of the ICTY on the other hand, is that in the latter it is a condition that the 
crime(s) against humanity is committed in an armed conflict, which is not a condition in 
the former two. The reason for this is most likely because the ICTY is a tribunal that 
deals directly with participants in a specific (armed) conflict (the conflict(s) in the 
former Yugoslavia), while the other two are “general” rules, in the sense that they can be 
applied to different situations, instances and places, not just armed conflicts. All three 
rules has a condition “civilian population”/“sivilbefolkning”. It is worthwhile looking 
into these cases before the ICTY because several of them are about crimes against 
                                                        
27 The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Milan Babic, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Indictment, Case No. IT-03-72 “RSK”, November 2003, p. 1. 
28 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), September 
2009, p. 6. 
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humanity against civilian populations and transgressions against article 5 of the ICTY 
Statute. Even Article 5 of the ICTY Statute is about crimes against humanity and not 
about war crimes and other similar crimes, such as for example Article 3 of the ICTY 
Statute which is about “(v)iolations of the laws and customs of war…”29 Even though a 
condition is that transgression of Article 5 takes place during armed conflict, the more 
significant conditions are “crimes against humanity” and “civilian population”. There are 
other articles in the ICTY Statute that deals with pure war crimes.  
 
     According to the ICTY indictment, Milan Babic “participated in a joint criminal 
exercise that came into existence no later than 1 August 1991 and continued until at 
least June 1992. The purpose of this joint criminal exercise was the permanent forcible 
removal of the majority of the Croat and non-Serb population from approximately one-
third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia (“Croatia”), in order to make them part of 
a new Serb-dominated state through the commission of crimes in violation of Article 3 
and 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal.”30 The case against Babic has been concluded and a 
sentence has been given, and also for this it is worth looking into it, because the fact that 
it is not an ongoing case such as most cases that have been discussed so far, puts this 
case in another light. According to the legal findings in the sentence, “Babic pleaded 
guilty to count 1 of the Indictment alleging persecution on political, racial, and religious 
grounds, a crime against humanity punishable under Article 5(h) of the Tribunal’s 
Statute… Babic admitted the persecution of non-Serb civilians through acts of 
extermination or murder, imprisonment and confinement, deportation or forcible 
                                                        
29 Ibid., p. 5. 
30 The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Milan Babic, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Indictment, Case No. IT-03-72 “RSK”, November 2003, p. 1. 
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transfer…”31 The ICTY in other words found, through Babic’s guilty plea, that the Croat 
and non-Serb population must be considered a civilian population. They can be seen to 
have the defining characteristic of being “racially”, as the ICTY phrases it, (“ethnically” 
would be another way to phrase it), different from the Serb population. They can also be 
seen as politically as well as religiously different, thus having different distinguishing 
characteristics. The court does not go into explanations or extrapolations about the term 
“political, racial or religious”, and does not attempt to separate the terms from each 
other, and decide which one is more appropriate. Instead it is satisfied that one, several 
or all of the terms/conditions are fulfilled, and if one of the defining characteristics of 
two different non-Serb populations are different from each other (as well as of course 
from the Serb population), this does not pose a problem. The non-Serb populations that 
were transgressed against, can in other words be considered one or several populations 
(with distinguishing characteristics different from the Serb population), and they must 
also be seen as being civilian because they were inhabitants of the areas were the 
transgressions against them started and they were not military. But this is not 
problematized in the sentencing judgment from the ICTY either. Claire de Than and 
Edwin Shorts point out that “Article 5 of the ICTY refers to crimes committed against any 
civilian population, irrespective of their race, nationality, religion or political status, and 
is therefore non-discriminatory…32” So whatever the distinguishing characteristic of the 
civilian population is, it does not much matter, as long as it can be differentiated against 
the aggressor. They further state that “(c)ivilians include not only non-combatants, but 
also those who are hors de combat or persons not longer actively involved in the 
                                                        
31 Trial Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Milan Babic, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), Sentencing Judgment, III. Legal findings. A. The Crime of Persecution 
within a Joint Criminal Enterprise, 29, 30, p. 12.   
32 Claire de Than, Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, “Chapter 5. Crimes against 
humanity. The meaning of “any civilian population””, Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2003, p. 93.  
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hostilities. In certain circumstances it may also comprise of those persons who were at 
one time members of an armed resistance movement, but have no abstained from such 
conduct.”33 This quotation underlines the fact that there are several different categories 
of persons that fit into ‘civilian population’, and even though it is not further discussed 
how the population of non-Serbs that were transgressed against in the Babic-case, what 
constitutes civilian in ‘civilian population’ is an ever returning question.  
 
     In regards to what de Than and Shorts write about ‘civilians’ including not only non-
combatants, it is worth also to look into the often-mentioned scenario of a civilian 
defending his family with the use of a weapon. When it comes to the use of weapons, 
members of the military and others who carry weapons are usually not included in the 
‘civilian’ part of the term ‘civilian population’, but  ´Kriangsak Kittichaisaree points out 
that there are exceptions to this. He writes, concerning the use of the term ‘civilian’, that 
it is “the situation faced by the victim (sic) at the time of the commission of the crime 
that must be taken into account to determine whether they have the ‘civilian’ status. For 
instance, where the head of a family is compelled to use arms to defend his family, he 
does not lose his civilian status; neither do the police or local defense force who act in 
this manner although they are formed in an attempt to prevent the cataclysm of armed 
conflicts.”34 Also de Than and Shorts writes about this, and both de Than and Shorts, and 
Kittichaisaree refer to the ICTY case against Tihomir Blaškić before the Trial Chamber 
(ICTY, Blaskic, Judgment, March 3, 2000, para. 213-214), in regards to this.35  
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34 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001, p. 95. 
35 Ibid., p. 95. And Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, Sweet 
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     8. The situation in Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) 
     The presumption principle makes it important to consult cases from international 
tribunals such as the ICTR in the interpretation of Strl. §102, because Norwegian law is 
presumed to be in accordance with international law. NOU-2002-04 also refers to the 
statute of an international tribunal (the ICC that deal with crimes against humanity), so 
to look into the ICTR that also deals with crimes against humanity, strengthens the 
interpretation of Strl. §102 and its condition ‘civilian population’ within Norwegian law.  
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by Resolution 
955 of the United Nations Security Council in November 1994.36 The ICTR was set up in 
response to the Rwandan genocide, that took place in Rwanda during approximately 
100 days during 1994 (from the beginning of April to the middle of July), and estimates 
state the number of persons killed between 500,000 to 1 million. It grew out of a long, 
ongoing conflict between the minority Tutsi (who for centuries had power in the 
area/nation) and the majority Hutu. The killings started as a violent reaction to the 
killing of the country’s president Juvénal Habyarimana on April 6th, with the offenders 
being primarily Hutus and the victims being Tutsis and pro-peace Hutus.37 The ICTR’s 
jurisdiction cover the genocide and other serious violations of international law that 
took place in Rwanda, as well as the country’s citizens in neighboring states between 
January 1st to December 31st 1994. It has jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 
Three and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions that includes crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes.38  
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     The case against Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first trial before the ICTR, and it began in 
1997. It is worth to look into this particular case because it concerns among other 
crimes, crimes against humanity, but also because it being the first it worked as a kind of 
standard for cases that followed it in front of the ICTR (if not exactly a precedent per se). 
In point 167 of the Judgment it is stated that “all acts and omissions set forth in this 
indictment took place between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in the commune 
of Taba, prefecture of Gitarama, territory of Rwanda.”39 Paragraph 7 of the indictment is 
about genocide, and in relation to it there is within the text of the Judgment a discussion 
of what was meant by being members of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.40 
This is of importance in relation to paragraph 8 of the indictment that charged crimes 
against humanity. In reference to the indictment, point 173 of the Judgment states that 
crimes against humanity “were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population on national, political, ethnic or racial grounds.”41 To apply 
the indictment’s interpretation of crimes against humanity, it was seen as important 
how the crime of genocide from the indictment was applied, precisely because of how 
“national, ethnic or racial group” was interpreted. This would translate and be 
accommodated into the understanding of civilian population, and the understanding of 
civilian population by the ICTR, informs and underpins the interpretation of civilian 
population (sivilbefolkning) in Strl. §102.  
     Witnesses before the court testified to the fact that the acts of violence were 
committed to destroy the Tutsi population.42 This is a condition for applying the crime of 
                                                        
39 The Prosecutor versus Jean-Paul Akayesu Case no. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, Chamber I, International 
Criminal Court for Rwanda, September 2, 1998, 5. Factual Findings, 5.1. General Allegations, Factual 
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40 Ibid., Point 173. 
41 Ibid., Point 173.  
42 Ibid., Point 168. 
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genocide. Of greater importance in relation to crimes against humanity is whether the 
victims could be seen to be a member of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group 
(conditions contained within the term “civilian population” in crimes against humanity).  
The Chamber giving the Judgment stated that “the Tutsi population does not have its 
own language or a distinct culture from the rest of Rwandan population.”43 Even so, the 
Chamber did find “objective indicators” that showed the Tutsi population to be group 
with “a distinct identity”.44 The Rwandan citizens were identified by, among other 
things, their ethnic group (either Tutsi, Hutu or Twa), according to enforced laws and 
Rwanda’s Constitution. Before 1994 all Rwandan citizen had to carry with them, also 
according to law, identity cards where what ethnic groups the different citizens 
belonged to, was described. The Judgment states that “Article 16 of the Constitution of 
the Rwandan Republic, of 10 June 1991, reads, “All citizens are equal before the law, 
without any discrimination, notably, on grounds of race, colour, origin, ethnicity, clan, 
sex, opinion, religion, or social position”. Article 57 of the Civil Code of 1988 provided 
that a person would be identified by “sex, ethnic group, name, residence, and domicile.” 
Article 118 of the Civil Code provided that birth certificates would include “the year, 
month, date and place of birth, the sex, the ethnic group, the first and last name of the 
infant.””45 For these reasons, as well as the fact that Rwandan customary rules based on 
patrilineal lines of heredity decided what ethnic group an individual belonged to, 
individuals were clearly seen to belong to the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa ethnicities or groups.46  
     From the findings and statements of the ICTR Chamber’s Judgment, it is made clear 
that the Tutsis were seen as an ethnic group or (civilian) population because of the fact 
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that they had been perceived as such an ethnic group through the long history in the 
Rwandan territory. Here it can be seen that it is enough for a group of individuals to be 
considered an ethnic group or (civilian) population as long as they are perceived as one. 
There could exist a distinguishing characteristic within the group, and such a 
characteristic could also exist partly because the individuals were seen as a population 
(or civilian population because the main part of the population were civilians, and 
therefore the individuals that were civilian could be seen as part of the civilian 
population). It is enough for the group to be a distinct group or population, that it is 
perceived this way, but the perception has to be constant, as well as last over time. The 
perception has also to be shared by a large group of people, and if this includes the 
members of the group or population themselves, it strengthens the idea of them being a 
population. The perception was culturally and historically based, but it also had a legal 
form, so that the perception of the Tutsis as a distinct group was many faceted and 
strong (and still continues to exist in Rwanda and the surrounding countries, even 
though the legal categorization has disappeared).  
     According to paragraph 8 of the indictment, the crimes against humanity “were 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on 
national, political, ethnic or racial grounds.”47 For the crimes against humanity to be 
applicable it is precisely necessary that the attack was part of a widespread or 
systematic attack. The interpretation of civilian population is to some degree connected 
with this condition, because the two conditions depend on each other and must both be 
fulfilled for crimes against humanity to be applicable. But the condition of the attack 
being part of a widespread or systematic attack is also connected with the concept of 
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civilian population in that there are (potentially) several members of a civilian 
population, and for the attack to be part of a widespread or systematic attack it has to be 
committed against several members of the population. There is no clear minimal limit to 
the number of persons who has to be members of the civilian population, just as there is 
no clear minimal limit for victims of the attack, for the attack to be part of a widespread 
or systematic attack. But arguably there cannot be too few members of the civilian 
population, and not too few victims of the attack either, and the more precise sizes of the 
persons and victims must be found through court cases. The sizes of the population and 
the group of victims cannot be an exact or stable number. Instead it will depend on the 
situation what sizes are required.  
 
     9. The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the principle of complementarity 
 
     The preparatory work to the Norwegain Strl. §102, NOU-2002-04, refers to the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, so that cases that concerns crimes against humanity before the ICC, 
are a necessary help in interpreting ‘civilian population’ in the Norwegian section. The 
International Criminal Court follows the principle of complementarity, according to 
which the states retain the main responsibility for criminal prosecution.48 This is the 
opposite from how the ICTY and the ICTR operate. These two tribunals can demand that 
cases be transferred to them even when the cases already have started as national court 
cases, and thus, at least in principle, the ICTY and the ICTR take precedence over 
national courts.49  The ICC is, on the other hand, complementary. 
     Jo Stigen writes about the two aspects of complementarity, the tests of admissibility 
                                                        
48 Morten Ruud, Geir Ulfstein, Innføring i folkerett, Universitetsforlaget: Oslo, 2008, p. 143. 
49 Ibid., p. 280. 
 33 
and procedural discretion; “…the principle of complementarity… governs the ICC’s 
exercise of jurisdiction. The essence of the principle is that the ICC shall only exercise 
jurisdiction over a case when no state proceeds genuinely with it and ICC interference in 
that particular case will serve the interests of justice.”50 
     With regards to the legal meaning the ICC is complementary to the national court 
systems, and starts functioning when national court processes are not effective or 
possible (in the sense that they actually do take place). The Preamble and Article 1 and 
17 of the Rome Statute establish the principle of complementarity in regards to the ICC.  
     The principle of complementarity is of importance in relation to the Norwegian Strl. 
§102 (crimes against humanity). In interpreting this section, the preparatory work NOU-
2002-04, as mentioned, specifically refers to the Rome Statute, so to consult court cases 
from the ICC, as mentioned, is of importance. And even if a case would be eligible for the 
ICC, it would still be prosecuted in the Norwegian court system as long as the process is 
possible (in the sense that it actually does takes place) and effective, according to the 
preamble, and article 1 and 17 of the Rome Statute.  
     Aside from the direct reference to the Rome Statute in NOU-2002-04, and even 
though Norwegian law follows the dualistic principle in relation to international law, 
Norwegian law is presumed to be in compliance with international law, as long as it is 
not in direct conflict with it. This means that it is important that court cases from the ICC 
are consulted when interpreting Strl. §102, because it is natural and important with 
uniformity between the Norwegian courts and the ICC in the interpretation of crimes 
against humanity. This unity is of importance, as seen from the point of view of the 
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 34 
Norwegian law because of the aforementioned exception to the dualistic principle, 
according to which Norwegian law is presumed to be in compliance with international 
law as long as it is not in direct conflict with it. But it is also important with unity in the 
interpretation, as seen from the perspective of the ICC, which promotes unity in the 
interpretation of the crimes, such as crimes against humanity, so as to achieve a just 
treatment of defendants, and to make sure that defendants do not get different 
treatment and sentencing depending on what national court system their cases go to 
trial in. It is of importance because then the ICC does not have to take on cases that are 
not processed effectively (in the sense of being in accordance with court cases from the 
ICC). It is also important for the national court system, for example the Norwegian court 
system, because otherwise the ICC will perhaps look with skepticism towards the 
national courts in question, and could more easily take on cases that those national 
courts would want to handle in the future. It will perhaps be interpreted as a 
stigmatizing measure towards these national courts, and a loss of prestige.  
     Other international tribunals, such as the ICTY and the ICTR, can be able to take on 
cases that concern crimes against humanity, and if they are, they will take on these cases, 
instead of the national courts. But it is nonetheless important to look also into cases 
from other international tribunals than the ICC, because of the exception to the dualistic 
principle, which states that as long as there is no direct conflict, Norwegian law must be 
presumed to be in accordance with international law, and to consult court cases from 
different tribunals, give a stronger and wider underpinning for interpreting the 
Norwegian Strl. §102.  
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     10. The International Criminal Court and the situation in Uganda 
 
     The preparatory work NOU-2002-4 of Strl. §102 refers to the article 7 of the Rome 
Statue of the ICC, so that court cases from the ICC that employ that article are relevant in 
the interpretation of Strl. §102, and the presumption principle also makes cases from 
the ICC of relevance. Concerning the Situation in Uganda before the ICC, the Warrant for 
the arrest of Joseph Kony in Pre-Trial Chamber II, states that Joseph Kony (the leader of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army/LRA) had given a “general order to attack civilians” .51 There 
were several instances where there were attacks on civilians, and one of the attacks that 
took place in an IDP-camp (Internally Displaced Person) where men, women and 
children were bludgeoned to death, and further resulting in “wounding of…residents of 
the camps” and “death…of civilians”.52 If one applies Strl. §102 to this attack, and with 
the focus on the term “sivibefolkning” (civilian population), the internally displaced 
persons could in this instance be considered civilians, and some of these civilians were 
wounded and some even killed. When it comes to civilians being wounded this falls 
without crime against humanity according to §102, but the killing of (a) person(s) falls 
within letter a in the section (“dreper en person” – kills a person).  
 
     Another question is whether the victims were part of a “population” (in the term 
‘civilian population’). They were all (civilian) members of the IDP-camp. They could be 
thought of as a population in their capacity of being (civilian) internally displaced 
persons. But this population could be seen as not having any strong internal bonds if 
they came from different parts of the country Uganda. That they were Ugandans is not 
                                                        
51 The Warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005, amended on 27 September 2005, in Pre-
Trial Chamber II (ICC-02/04-01/05-53), The International Criminal Court (ICC), para. 26, p. 9. 
52 Ibid., para. 24, p. 8. 
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necessarily enough to be considered a (civilian) population in this instance. It is 
necessary for a civilian population to have a distinguishing characteristic. A pre-trial 
chamber of the ICC said, in regards to a situation in the Republic of Kenya, that those 
attacked must be part of “groups distinguished by nationality, ethnicity, or other 
distinguishing feature”.53 When it comes to those attacked in the IDP-camp, they were 
distinguished by being of the same nationality (Ugandans), but they were of the same 
nationality as the attackers (Ugandans) and the order given by Kony was general in 
form, so that such a characteristic in this instance cannot be seen as being enough on its 
own. It could be argued that in such an instance there has to be some further 
characteristic than that of nationality. An attack does not need to attack the whole 
‘population’ either, as made clear in the case of Kamuhanda before the ICTR.54  
 
     One could possibly divide the population of internally displaced persons in the camp, 
into those that with the same family, tribe or local geographical ties. Then the murder of 
some of them could perhaps be considered a crime against humanity, while the murder 
of others (who were not part of a (sizable enough?) population) would not be 
considered a crime against humanity (but arguably a war crime because the murders 
were committed during a military conflict). (Concerning the size of a population, it could 
be seen as “implausible and morally repulsive to draw a quantitative line” as Margaret M 
deGuzman writes in regards to crime against humanity and its connection with the term 
“widespread”.55  No absolute line can be drawn when it comes to the size of a civilian 
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 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09), Authorization Decision, 31 March 2010, para. 81, 
referred to in Margaret M. deGuzman, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Routledge Hanbook of International 
Criminal Law, edited by William A. Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, Routledge: Abingdon, 2011, p. 130.  
54 Kamuhanda, (ICTR-95-54A-T), Judgment, 22 January 2004, para. 669, referred to in Margaret M. 
deGuzman, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Routledge Hanbook of International Criminal Law, edited by 
William A. Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, Routledge: Abingdon, 2011, p. 130. 
55 Margaret M. deGuzman, “Crimes Against Humanity”, Routledge Hanbook of International Criminal Law, 
edited by William A. Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, Routledge: Abingdon, 2011, p. 130. 
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population that fulfills the term in Strl. §102.) The warrant of Joseph Kony does not 
contain all the above-mentioned information, but if it would be deemed necessary, this 
information could perhaps be discovered in the trial before the ICC. Arguably the 
‘population’ part of the ‘civilian population’ term could be fulfilled because the victims 
had the common characteristics of being civilian, internally displaced persons from 
Uganda.  
 
     The crime has also to be part of a widespread and systematic attack (“ledd i et utbredt 
eller systematisk angrep”). Kony had given a general order to attack civilians, and 
several attacks were committed, and this could fulfill ‘the widespread and systematic 
attack’ condition. But such attacks and such an order as Kony has been considered to 
have given, are arguably not specifically enough targeted against a particular civilian 
population. As has been mentioned above, the population was civilian, internally 
displaced persons from Uganda. But the term ‘civilian population’ taken together with 
‘part of a widespread and systematic attack’, the civilian population would have to have 
a less general, more specific characteristic. This could have been that it was a specific 
tribe, or a population of a specific ethnicity, or a political (civilian) population. These 
specific characters are possible options for the term (civilian) population. There are 
none such clear defining characteristics that can be applied to LRA’s murder victims in 
this instance, both because the order of attack on civilians were “general”56, and in the 
attack being discussed there were no one population singled out or specifically attacked, 
but instead an attack in which all (types of) civilians were attacked. Even though the 
victims were ‘civilian’, and they were part of a ‘population’, as mentioned, they cannot be 
considered a ‘civilian population’ in the context of the section’s condition of ‘part of a 
                                                        
56 The Warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005, amended on 27 September 2005, in Pre-
Trial Chamber II (ICC-02/04-01/05-53), The International Criminal Court (ICC), para. 26, p. 9. 
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widespread and systematic attack’. Thus in this instance mentioned in the warrant for 
Joseph Kony, the crime against humanity as formulated in Strl §102, is not applicable. 
The case against Joseph Kony has not been decided, and thus the ICC has not drawn its 
conclusion, because Kony has not been apprehended and the court has not decided the 
case in absentia.  
 
     When interpreting the term ‘civilian population’ that is used in both Str. §102 and 
article 7 of the Rome Statute, the question arises of how narrow or wide the 
interpretation should be. In the Kupreskic-case before ICTY, it was stated that it “would 
seem that a wide definition of “civilian” and “population” is intended.”57 A wide 
interpretation or definition can according to this be made of the condition (‘civilian 
population’), more easily fulfilling it in regards to an attack, as long as the attack is not a 
singular attack without any connection to a wider attack.58 Even though the condition of 
a civilian population may be more easily fulfilled according to legal tradition, it is still of 
importance to find out when it is fulfilled, because without this condition being fulfilled, 
the section cannot be applied, even though all the other conditions of crime(s) against 
humanity are fulfilled.  
 
     11. The International Criminal Court and the Situation in Darfur in Sudan  
     According to Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC in the Warrant for the Arrest of Ahmad 
Harun “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Sudanese Armed Forces and the 
                                                        
57 Kupreskic (ICTY-95-16), Judgment 14 January 2000, para. 547, referred to in Margaret M. deGuzman, 
“Crimes Against Humanity”, Routledge Hanbook of International Criminal Law, edited by William A. 
Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, Routledge: Abingdon, 2011, pp. 130, 137.  
58 Kunarac, (ICTY-96-23/1-A), Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 90, referred to in Margaret M. deGuzman, 
“Crimes Against Humanity”, Routledge Hanbook of International Criminal Law, edited by William A. 
Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, Routledge: Abingdon, 2011, p. 130. 
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Militia/Janjaweed (attacked) the towns of Kodom, Bindisi, Mukjar, Arawala and 
surrounding areas over an extensive period of time…”59 There was no rebel activities in 
these towns, and the attacked civilians took no part in the hostilities. Pre-Trial Chamber 
I holds that the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Militia/Janjaweed committed criminal 
acts such as murder of civilians, rapes and outrages upon the personal dignity of women 
and girls. The attacks were intentionally directed against the civilian populations (Pre-
Trial Chamber I uses this term) of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. There also occurred the 
destruction of property belonging to these populations and pillaging of the towns. 
During the attacks “persecution, murders, forcible transfers, imprisonment or severe 
deprivation of liberty, acts of torture, rape and other inhumane acts”60 took place against 
the aforementioned populations. These acts were, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber I 
of the ICC, crimes against humanity according to the Rome Statute 7(1)a, 7(1)d, 7(1)e, 
7(1)f, 7(1)g, 7(1)h and 7(1)k.  These subsections are parallel to Strl. §102 a), §102 d), 
§102 e), §102 f), §102 g), §102 h) and §102 k). As previously mentioned, the 
preparatory work NOU-2002-04. Ny Straffelov §16-3, refers to the Rome Statute, so it is 
worthwhile to look into such instances as this one here being discussed, to clarify when 
the term “civilian population” is applicable under the Norwegian section.  
     Regarding Strl. §102 and its term ‘civilian population’ (sivilbefolkning), the warrant 
states that those who were attacked were civilians that had taken no part in the 
hostilities. According to this, the condition of “civilian” must be fulfilled. When it comes 
to the condition “population”, it has, according the Authorization Decision from the ICC 
regarding the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09), to have a distinguishing 
feature. This pre-trial chamber of the ICC stated that the victims must belong to “groups 
                                                        
59 Warrant for the arrest of Ahmad Harun issued on 27 April 2007, in Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC, (ICC-
02/05-01/07-2), The International Criminal Court (ICC), p. 3/16. 
60 Ibid., p. 4/16. 
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distinguished by nationality, ethnicity, or other distinguishing features.”61 For a group to 
fulfill the ‘population’ part of the condition ‘civilian population’, it has to have within and 
between itself at least one distinguishing feature. The distinguishing feature has to be 
something that establishes a potential more permanent connection between the 
members of the group. As is mentioned in the Authorization Decision these features 
could be of national, ethnic or of other elements. A national distinguishing feature could 
encompass several different ethnic distinguishing features. It could therefore be argued 
that a distinguishing feature that is national is not necessarily enough in every situation. 
It could arguably play a part whether the attacking group and the victims are of the 
same nationality, and whether the group of victims was targeted because of the 
members’ nationality. How many inhabitants the nation has all in all could possibly play 
in, because the fewer nationals the nation has, the more capable the feature is of being a 
distinguishing characteristic.  
     Margaret M. deGuzman writes that the statement of the pre-trial chamber of the ICC 
“suggests a requirement of discriminatory group targeting and leaves open which 
“distinguishing features” are sufficient. Does a group of peacekeepers qualify, for 
example?”62 Whether it is a requirement that the targeting of the group is discriminatory 
in nature, could be discussed. Arguably, the solution could be that it does not necessarily 
have had to be discriminatory, but for an attack to be considered a crime against 
humanity, one or several (civilian) populations with distinguishing features have to be 
found in or among the victims. In regards to if any distinguishing feature is sufficient, or 
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if not, what distinguishing features are, it can perhaps be said that the distinguishing 
feature has to be clear, strong and permanent to be fulfill the condition of (civilian) 
population. It must be clear in the sense that the distinguishing feature properly 
separates the group/population from other groups/populations, when considered in 
light of exactly that distinguishing feature. It has to be strong to unite the 
group/population into a coherent whole, in the sense that it must be felt and understood 
by the victims as a natural connection (religious, ethnic or other) within the group, and 
the members must in one way feel or understand that the group can naturally belong, or 
at least be seen to belong, together. And the distinguishing feature must perhaps also be 
seen as being permanent to let the group be considered a population, so that the 
distinguishing feature is not simply a temporary, random or ephemeral connection.  
     Those attacked were of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit ethnicities, so that here the 
distinguishing features are arguably present, because within each of the ethnic groups 
there exists a strong enough connection (ethnicity), so that each group is a population 
on its own, and the condition of “population” is therefore fulfilled for each group. The 
“civilian” part of the condition must also be fulfilled because the members of these 
ethnic groups were not combatants but rather civilians, and together this means that 
those attacked can be considered ‘civilian populations’. In the warrant it is also stated 
that it was these groups (the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit ethnicities) that the attacks were 
directed against. The condition of the attack having to be directed against these civilian 
populations, is therefore fulfilled as well.   
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     12. The International Criminal Court and the Situation in the Republic of Congo 
 
     In the warrant against Germain Katanga, the alleged leader of FRPI (the Force de 
résistance patriotique en Ituri (Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri], it is stated that there 
occurred an attack against the village of Bogoro. During and after this attack “several 
criminal acts against civilians primarily of Hema ethnicity” were committed. These 
included, and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I claim they are crimes against humanity – 
“murder of about 200 civilians…causing of serious harm to civilians…arresting, 
threatening with weapons and imprisoning civilians in a room filled with 
corpses…pillaging…and the sexual enslavement of several women and girls”.63 Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of the ICC holds that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that Germain 
Katanga is criminally responsible under article 25(3)a or, in the alternative, under 
article 25(3)b of the (Rome) Statute, for…” murder as a crime against humanity under 
article 7(1)a under the Rome Statute, inhumane acts as a crime against humanity (article 
7(1)k), and sexual slavery as a crime against humanity (article 7(1)g).64  
     In the attack on the village Bogoro, the crimes were committed against civilians of 
primarily the Hema ethnicity. The condition of “civilian” in “civilian population” in Strl. 
§102 would be fulfilled, as is made clear from the warrant. The remaining question is 
whether the ‘population’ condition would be fulfilled. The context of the term ‘civilian 
population’ in Strl. §102 is of importance: ‘attack directed against a civilian population’ 
(’angrep rettet mot en sivilbefolkning’). The crimes in Bogoro were primarily committed 
against civilians of the Hema ethnicity, but not only them, and ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I 
states that “there are reasonable grounds to believe the attack directed against the 
                                                        
63 Warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga issued on 2 July 2007, in Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC, (ICC-
01/04-01/07), The International Criminal Court (ICC), p. 4/7. 
64 Ibid., p. 6/7. 
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village of Bogoro was indiscriminate”.65  The word indiscriminate can be interpreted as 
when “an indiscriminate action is done without thought about what the result may be, 
especially when it causes people to be harmed”66, according to the definition in Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. This meaning is perhaps the common meaning in 
everyday parlance, but it has a somewhat subjective significance, and would perhaps be 
misplaced in a legal text such as a warrant. It is more probable that what was meant by 
“indiscriminate” was that the attack was committed without distinction between 
persons or groups. If then the attack on Bogoro was committed without distinction 
between persons or groups, the question would become whether the fact that not only 
civilians of the Hema ethnicity but also other civilians were targeted, make it so that the 
attack cannot have been seen to having been directed against a civilian population (Strl. 
§102). In Prosecutor v. Kunarac, that was before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), it is pointed out that the attack must be directed against a 
civilian population, “that is, the civilian population must be the primary target of the 
attack.”67 That a similar definition as that in Article 7 in the Rome Statute of the ICC, and 
more importantly, the Strl. §102 of crime against humanity, in an international tribunal 
such as the ICTY is, is interpreted in this way, is a strong argument for also interpreting 
in the other sections in the same way.  
     One could then ask whether the fact that also other civilians were attacked, means 
that the attack would not be considered to have been against those of the Hema 
ethnicity, who could arguably in themselves be considered a civilian population. Those 
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of the Hema ethnicity could arguably be considered to be a social population because it 
is clear that they were civilians (as stated in the warrant), and they could be seen as a 
population because they shared the same ethnicity (Hema). Even if also other civilians 
were attacked, the social population of the Hema group could still be considered the 
target. In the context of Strl. §102 the intent behind the attack then becomes important, 
in being able to see whether the civilians being attacked were a social population. If, as 
mentioned, it was just the Hema ethnicity/group that was targeted, the condition of 
social population in Strl. §102 is fulfilled, but if it was all those in the area (Bogoro) were 
targeted in the attack, then further research of the facts is necessary to determine 
whether this condition is fulfilled. Even if other civilians were attacked does not mean 
that they were targeted per se, so that the condition of social population would be 
fulfilled even if other civilians were attacked, because the target would be the social 
population itself. This means that in this instance the condition of social population 
would have been fulfilled if it was the Hema ethnicity that was targeted, even if other 
civilians were actually also attacked in the attack for example because they were in the 
area.  
     But in this instance it seems clear that everyone in Bogoro were targeted, as can be 
shown by the statement that it was an indiscriminate attack. This means that the target 
was everyone in Bogoro, and not just those of the Hema ethnicity, and thus the ethnicity 
of those of the Hema ethnicity cannot make them a social population on their own in the 
context of Strl. §102 – all the civilians in Bogoro will have to be considered a civilian 
population (together). The civilians in Bogoro would have to have at least another 
common characteristic/distinguishing feature than the same ethnicity, which they lack. 
That a distinguishing feature is necessary for a group to be considered a population is 
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made clear in the Authorization Decision from the ICC regarding the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya.68 This could be that they were of close ethnicities or that they were of 
the same geographical group, or other common characteristics. The distinguishing 
feature of geographical group could here arguably be fulfilled, but there is not enough 
information in this warrant to conclude on this in this specific case. The (other) civilians 
could be of the place, but they could also have been refugees. If that was the case, then 
yet other distinguishing feature could be relevant, such as religion or political affiliation. 
But as mentioned, the information in the warrant for Germain Katanga is too incomplete 
to conclude. 
 
     13. The attack on the Norwegian Labor Party’s youth organization (AUF) on 
Utøya in Norway on 22nd July 2011 
 
     The attack on the camp for members of the Norwegian Labor Party’s youth 
organization AUF (Arbeiderpartiets Ungdomsfylking) on Utøya in Norway on 22nd July 
2011 has made the issue of crime against humanity and what constitutes a civilian 
population relevant in relation to Norwegian society. Strl. §102 could possibly be 
applied to this act, but the indictment against the offender Anders Behring Breivik, 
applies other paragraphs. (The offender also detonated a bomb next to government 
buildings, and has also been indicted for this, but this will not be further discussed here.) 
 
     The indictment states that the relevant sections, concerning the attack on Utøya are: 
“The (Norwegian) Criminal Statute (Straffeloven 22. mai, nr. 10, 1902) §147a first 
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paragraph letter b, cf. § 233 first and second paragraph, for having committed an act of 
terrorism, by transgressing against the Criminal Statute (Straffeloven 22. mai, nr. 10, 
1902) §233 first and second paragraph (premeditated homicide and aggravating 
circumstances exist), with the intent to create serious fear in a population.”69 (My 
translation.)  
 
     Even if the Strl. §102 is not applied, it could hypothetically be used in such a situation, 
and then the question would be whether the members of the AUF-camp could be 
considered to be a civilian group (sivilbefolkning). The individual members of AUF share 
the similarity that they are members of this political youth organization. Is this enough 
to be a distinguishing characteristic? This characteristic is political in nature, but the 
members of AUF arguably share another common characteristic, that of their age. 
Regular members of AUF are under 35 years of age, while supporting members can be 
older.70 There is no minimum age limit. Could then the age of the members be seen as a 
distinguishing characteristic? If one includes also supporting members (who were over 
35 years of age) the characteristic is clearly too wide, so that it cannot be seen as a 
distinguishing characteristic. But most of the individuals that were present at the Utøya 
camp, and most of those who ultimately were victims of the acts on the island, were 
regular members of AUF. Can these individuals who were under the age of 35 be seen to 
share the distinguishing characteristic of age? The answer must be no, because the age 
limit is too high. The nationality or ethnicity could be discussed as being distinguishing 
characteristics, but the nationality of the members were Norwegian, and the offender 
was himself Norwegian, and the acts took place in Norway, so this characteristic cannot 
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be seen as a distinguishing characteristic, as it is shared by the great majority of the 
inhabitants of the country were the acts took place. The ethnicities of the members were 
not only ethnically Norwegian, but instead the attendees of the camp arguably had a 
more mixed ethnic composition than what is the norm in Norwegian society. Still the 
different ethnicities do not play a defining part when it comes to distinguishing 
characteristics, because even if the members were of different ethnicities, they were still 
nationals of Norway, so that the different ethnicities are no hindrance to seeing them as 
having a distinguishing characteristic. But the Norwegian nationality, as already 
mentioned, cannot be seen as a distinguishing characteristic.  
 
     The political affiliation of being a member of the Norwegian Labor Party’s youth 
organization remains as a possible distinguishing characteristic. The political affiliation 
can be seen to create and sustain such a connection between the members as is 
necessary for it being a distinguishing characteristic. This can be based in the fact that 
the connection is permanent and strong enough to be considered a distinguishing 
characteristic because the members’ political affiliation had manifested itself in an 
actual membership of the organization of AUF, and further enhanced or underlined by 
the participation in the youth camp that is the most, or at least, one of the most 
important events in the year for the organization. 
 
     That the AUF members on Utøya can be seen to have the distinguishing characteristic 
of political affiliation fulfills the condition of civilian population (sivilbefolkning) in Strl. 
§102, so that the section could be applied to the acts committed on Utøya, as long as the 
other conditions are fulfilled. (But other sections were used in the indictment, as has 
been shown.) 
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     It has been argued that Strl. §102 cannot be used because the perpetrator acted on his 
own, and according to the section the act has to be committed as part of a widespread 
and systematic attack (“som ledd i et utbredt og systematisk angrep”). One argument 
against this could be that the attack on Utøya must be seen together with the attack on 
the government buildings that took place before. But because it is not fully clear 
whether the section can be applied, it is more natural to use Strl. 1902 §§147 and 233. 
Strl. 2005 §102 can give up to 30 years in prison, while 21 years in prison is the 
maximum that can be given according to Strl. 1902 §§147 and 223. The perpetrator 
could also be sentenced after these sections in either law to preventive custody 
(forvaring). Strl. 1902 §39 can be applied regarding preventive custody when there is a 
real danger (nærliggende fare) that the perpetrator will commit a similar, new crime. 
According to Strl. 1902 §39e, the maximum that can be given is 21 years of preventive 
custody, but after petition (begjæring) from the prosecution the court can pass an 
extension of preventive custody for five years at a time. If the prosecution applied Strl. 
2005 §102 the maximum preventive custody that the perpetrator could be sentenced to 
would be 21 years, or he could be sentenced to prison for 30 years. If he was sentenced 
to the longer prison sentence, he would have to be released after those maximum 30 
years, but if preventive custody was applied then he could be kept in prison longer, as 
long as the conditions in Strl. 1902 §§39 and 39e were fulfilled, theoretically for his 
whole life. And because the crime committed is so serious, and there is a perhaps fear of 
the perpetrator committing a similar crime in the future, the prosecution could prefer 
preventive custody. And if they did, there would be no added gain by applying Strl. 2005 
§102, because the preventive custody could not be longer than if Strl. 1902 §§147 and 
223 were applied. But instead the condition of Strl. 2005 §102 of the act being part of a 
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widespread and systematic attack could pause difficulties, while it is clear that Strl. 1902 
§§147 and 223 are applicable.71  
 
     As is mentioned in the introduction, it is worth noticing that it is still undecided by the 
court whether the perpetrator, Anders Bering Breivik, should be considered criminally 
insane (strafferettslig utilregnelig) or not. If he is considered to be criminally insane, he 
cannot be sentenced to imprisonment or protective custody (forvaring). The section 
could, however, still have been relevant, because it would still be necessary to prove that 
he transgressed against all of the components of Strl. §102. He could then be sentenced 
to compulsory psychiatric care (tvungent psykisk helsevern) (Str. 1902 §39, first 
paragraph), as long as he would be considered psychotic (psykotisk) when the offence 
took place (Strl. 1902 §44, first paragraph).  
 
     14. Conclusion 
 
     The term ‘civilian population’ in Strl. §102 must be interpreted according to the 
understanding of the word ‘civilian’ that mainly means non-military, but is in fact more 
many-faceted than that, and the word ‘population’ that must contain a minimum of 
individuals and within this group there must exist a distinguishing feature (that can be 
ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, and/or politics etc.) for it to be considered a 
population. When interpreting the section it is important to follow/use the sources of 
law, that include first looking into the linguistic meaning of Strl. §102 to also get a better 
understanding of the legal meaning. Then the preparatory works must be consulted, and 
                                                        
71 Aftenposten.no, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article4184191.ece#.T5VaY1FpuqQ, 
23/04/2012. 
 50 
here NOU-2002-04 is of great importance, and it refers to the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
The ICC is an international tribunal that deals with (among other tings) crimes against 
humanity, and because of the preparatory work refers to the Rome Statute of the ICC 
and because of the presumption principle, cases from this tribunal, as well as from other 
international tribunals that deal with crimes against humanity, must be examined. The 
presumption principle plays a part in using cases from international tribunals in the 
interpretation of Strl. §102, because according to this principle Norwegian law is 
presumed to be in accordance with international law, and Norwegian courts should 
attempt to interpret national law so that it does not come into conflict with international 
law. Opinions in legal theory must be consulted, as well as an assessment (reelle hensyn) 
of the term ‘civilian population’ itself. Concerning the assessment of the term, it is 
important that the term is not seen as being too wide, and an strict interpretation 
(innskrenkende tolkning) is to prefer to a wide one (utvidende tolkning), in part because 
of the principle of legality. There is arguably a danger with the fact that the preparatory 
work refers to international law and an international tribunal (the ICC), because through 
this, the development of the national law is to some extent moved away from the 
national law system to an international one, and the Norwegian courts retain less 
control of the section’s and the term’s interpretation. But this is perhaps not a great 
danger in itself, because through the use of the interpretation of the term from 
international law, the understanding of crimes against humanity attains a more uniform 
form. This is positive from a macro- or international perspective because this helps to 
ensure that individuals that are accused of crimes against humanity get an equal 
treatment before an international tribunal (such as the ICC) and a national court (such 
as a Norwegian court). This is an important development that needs to be enhanced, so 
that in the final analysis it is in fact more positive than negative that national 
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(Norwegian) law looks to international law in this way. Also, the international courts 
specialize in dealing with ‘international crimes’ such as crimes against humanity, so that 
they have attained expertise in interpreting and applying the section, and through this 
the national courts can gain by applying these interpretations.  
 
     The comparison between the section about genocide in the Norwegian Criminal 
Statute (Strl. §101) and the section about crimes against humanity (Strl. §102) in the 
same statute, shows that crimes against humanity can often be interpreted as being 
wider than the crime of genocide. This shows that Strl. §102 can be applied more often, 
and helps to define the width of the application of ‘civilian population’. Concerning the 
definition of the population, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg showed 
that it is clearly too wide to consider all those who were opposed to the Nazi party as a 
population, but that those who were Jewish can be seen as being a population. This 
shows that group can be a (civilian) population as long as there exists a distinguishing 
feature within that population. Cases before the ICTY shows that a distinguishing feature 
can be to belong to the same city, but this is generally too weak a connection. That 
individuals are in one defined area can strengthen the view of them as a population, but 
on its own it is never enough. Cases before the ICTR shows that even though a 
population does not have its own language or a distinct culture from the rest of the 
country’s population, it can still fulfill the condition of a (civilian) population. In the case 
of the Tutsis, this was achieved because of identification of ethnicity through laws, the 
country’s constitution and customary rules. A(n ethnic) group can be considered to be a 
(civilian) population as long as it is perceived as one over time, as long as the perception 
is constant, lasts over time and is shared by a large group of people.  
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     As is shown in regards to the situation in Uganda before the ICC, to be of a certain 
nationality is not necessarily enough to fulfill ‘civilian population’, especially when the 
attackers are of the same nationality. Family, tribe or local geographical ties can be 
distinguishing features as well. Concerning the size of the population, a quantitative 
measure cannot be construed, but it has not to be a too small group. As shown in regards 
to the ICC and the situation in Darfur in Sudan, it can be argued that the fewer members 
a population has, the more likely is it that the nationality can be a distinguishing feature, 
because then that feature becomes more “unique”. Cases before the ICC that dealt with 
the situation in the Republic of Congo, underlines that the civilian population has to be 
the primary target of the attack. ‘Civilian population’ can be fulfilled even if non-
members of the population are attacked, as long as the attack is directed towards the 
civilian population in question. In regards to the attack on the Labor Party’s youth camp 
at Utøya, age can be a distinguishing feature, but the age limit or category must then be 
very limited.   
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